Studying the organization of work has become an important element in the design of systems and artefacts for work settings. However, although studies of work have had an in#uence on design, there is still some concern about the nature of the relationship between the study of work and design. Concern has been variously expressed in terms of gaps between social science and systems engineering, formality and informality, prescription and negotiation and there have been a number of attempts to bridge those gaps. In contrast, the aim of this paper is to re-view the gap and to characterize it in such a way that bridging may not be an issue. This requires a reconceptualization of the relationship between designing artefacts and understanding work. Using Bateson's levels of analysis, an account of the paradox of framing the study of work by the norms and expectations of a rationalist approach to design, exempli"ed by software engineering, is developed. The study of work is characterized as inevitably involving self-referential observation and inscription, characteristics which create paradox when framed by the demands of rationalist design. However, Bateson's treatment of paradox allows us to see this relationship, not as a gap to be bridged, but as an opportunity to create new forms of punctuation for design, studying work, and relations between them. Many current attempts to reconceptualize design and its relationship with understanding work emphasize the dialogical aspects of practice and theory. Bakhtin's philosophy is used here to advance consideration of the dialogical aspects of &&understanding work for design'' with particular reference to the use of representations such as scenarios. A critique of exemplar representations is used to exemplify dimensions, such as addressivity and un"nalisability, that would characterize a dialogical punctuation of understanding work and design.
Introduction
Studies that provide insights into the social organization of work have been widely reported in the computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) literature (e.g. Heath & Lu!, 1992; Bowker, Timmermans & Star, 1995; Orr, 1996; Symon, Long & Ellis, 1996; Martin, Bowers & Wastell, 1997; Muller, 1999) . As well as teasing out implications for technological interventions in particular work settings, these studies suggest a shift of emphasis in the relationship between understanding work and designing artefacts. By focusing on concerned workers doing concrete, answerable, performed work and away from work as abstract possibility (Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988) , they emphasize dimensions which are often otherwise invisible and silent in design (Suchman, 1995; Star & Strauss, 1999) . However, while insights generated by these studies appear to work their way into design consideration*at least as evidenced by academic discourse in journals and conferences, and by commercial sponsorship of some of the research*there is still concern about the nature of the relationship between understanding work and articulating requirements for design.
Some see a gap between the worldviews and languages of social science and system design, particularly software engineering, and have tried to bridge this gap by providing methods, models and notations which facilitate the transfer of knowledge between the two. For example, Checkland and Scholes (1990) propose that activity models, which attempt to represent the results of cultural and logical analyses of information, can be the basis of information systems design. Beyer and Holzblatt (1998) , in their elucidation of Contextual Design, provide a set of work models which aim to express the full gamut of concerns from cultural to logical. In a more focused software-engineering contribution, Viller and Somerville (1998) present &&coherence'' as a method that structures the analysis of social issues and integrates the social analysis with a multi-perspective approach to requirements engineering. For each of these approaches, design is directed towards analysing and intervening in problem situations and their respective proposals can be seen as tools to support the analysis and description of complex problems in this context.
Others attempt to bridge the gap by re#ecting on the social organization of design itself, and by reconsidering the roles of social scientists and designers in design practice. Bentley, Hughes, Randall, Rodden, Sawyer, Shapiro and Somerville (1992) describe a design process in which system development, prototyping and tailoring occurs in parallel with requirements analysis built on social science methodologies, with the two streams of activity interacting in formal and informal ways throughout the process. Social scientists suggest ways of seeing for the development team which in turn constrains the search space of the social scientists. Rogers (1997) proposed a variation in which aspects of design are seen as a continuous dialogue between designers and users with the users either directly involved or represented by the social scientists. Bowker, Star, Turner and Gasser (1997) suggest that, by engaging with each other in practical projects over the last two decades, social scientists and computer scientists have begun to educate each other and shape each others' work. They see the gap as already being bridged by collaborative practice.
The metaphors used in the foregoing discussions, bridging a gap or moving beyond a divide, may contribute to the perpetuation of the very problem they specify. Those metaphors evoke philosophical conundrums which present themselves generation after generation, for example, in terms of the relationship between mental and material worlds or moral and physical sciences. It is not the aim of this paper to engage in these ancient debates. Rather, the aim is to reconceptualize the relationship between design and understanding work in such a way that bridging gaps or divides may not be a signi"cant issue. It should be clear from the outset then that no particular methodology will be o!ered in this paper. Nor will the ambiguities which appear to be part of understanding work for design be eliminated. Rather a pragmatic reconceptualization of the relationship will be developed with a view to suggesting how it might be possible to work with, rather than to eliminate, ambiguity. In this regard, Bateson's (1972) analysis of the contextual framing of di!erent levels of punctuation is used extensively in Section 2 to reconceptualize the problem. In Section 3, the analysis is applied to the practice of framing studies of work by the demands of rationalist design, such as software engineering. The potential for learning and moving on in revealing paradox is developed in Section 4 in a discussion of the dialogical aspects of representing work for design, which suggests alternative punctuations of both design and studying work. Although the dialogical aspects of design have been introduced in a number of papers, particularly in the collection edited by Bowker et al. (1997) , the speci"c aim here is to move things on by considering what a dialogical conceptualization of relations between design and understanding work would be like.
UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN
When used primarily to develop methods or describe requirements, the study of work is under-used in design. Anderson (1994) has already made this case with respect to ethnography which he argues can be used to examine the sensibilities which legitimate both design problems and approaches to solving them. His challenge is to use analyses of work to re#ect on pre-theoretical assumptions and decisions as a way of questioning the conventional frames of reference that support particular design perspectives, e.g. design as intervention in a problem situation. In this sense, a growing interest in the particulars of work practice has been a breath of fresh air for design. However, for many, it has also resulted in a haunting moment of dissatisfaction or restlessness best captured in anxiety about the problem of getting from descriptions of messy work situations to the practice of designing a system or an artefact. Taking Anderson's challenge seriously requires that we entertain the possibility that the anxiety may be the result of asking a question which makes little sense in the context in which it is asked.
The sensibilities of understanding the situated practices into which a system will be deployed may not be commensurable with the sensibilities of methods for getting from understanding work to designing an artefact. Whereas the former is open to the possibility that no technological intervention is required, the latter hardly ever is; whereas the former is sensitive to multiple perspectives on situated practices, the latter's sensitivity is to the issue of describing those perspectives in such a way that the design of a product is facilitated.
Understanding work practices can take a number of forms, what Anderson calls genres of reportage. Some forms are interested in familiarization with the work context and description of interesting features. Work by Beyer and Holzblatt (1998), and Monk, Wright, Haber and Davenport (1993) which is concerned with techniques for describing the context of use of a system is typical. The impressions formed are fed into a conventional design process as requirements relating to the context of use. Other forms are concerned with engaged interpretation and with questioning conventional understandings of the relationship between work, representation and design. They tend to view understanding and design as re#exive, interpretative, critical activities in which understandings of work and design are created hand in hand (e.g. Orr, 1996 Orr, , 1998 Berg 1997 Berg , 1998 McCarthy, 1998; McCarthy, Wright, Monk & Watts, 1998) .
When the meaning of &&understanding'' is framed by the need to specify requirements, questions about getting from understanding work to designing artefacts make sense. For example, from a software engineering perspective, it may be necessary to reduce whatever has been learnt about the organization of work to a description of interacting agents or a set of components such as viewpoints, concerns or foci. At the outset, understanding work is geared towards a particular kind of answer, the kind speci"ed by the notation.
THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN
Anything outside the notation is problematic. In contrast, when &&understanding'' is not framed by the needs of a speci"c design process, it can become a form of engagement with the organization of work practices which is sensitive to the &&open-endedness and hazard of action'' (Dunne, 1993, p. 367) . Raising questions about getting from understanding work to designing artefacts in the context of such studies of work can create the potential for pragmatic paradox (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; Bateson, 1972) .
As Watzlawick et al. (1967) described it, pragmatic paradox involves putting &&two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference . . . . in a relation of level and meta-level' ' (p. 256) . In terms of the question of moving from understanding work to design, the paradox emerges from putting a commitment to critical engagement and open-endedness in studying work inside an engineering frame for design. If critical engagement with work is forced to stand in relation of level to the meta-level of design-asengineering, it would be forced to be conventional and unconventional, seeing work as means-to-ends and critically questioning such construals of work, at the same time.
To appreciate the bind generated by attempts to move from critical engagement with work to the design of work artefacts, it is necessary to explicate the sensibilities of both and the way in which framing one in the context of the other can create incommensurable contexts of punctuation. Bateson (1972) referred to punctuation as a process of making distinctions in a sequence of events. For the purposes of the paper we can think of it as referring to the ways in which we construe or make sense of design, understanding work, and the relationship between them. In this context, construing work as a means-to-ends process is not problematic for the purposes of this article. Neither is a critical approach to work which challenges the means-to-ends construal. The problem emerges only from placing the two in a particular relationship with each other, where one contextually frames the other. Therefore, to understand how studying work for design has the potential to create a pragmatic paradox, a means of describing relations between level and meta-level is required. This need is already acutely revealed in the absence of re#exivity in the application of analyses of work to design. The insights from these analyses may be seen as useful in informing the design of a particular artefact but are rarely used to re#ect on design itself, because the design process is seen as framing those analyses. Bateson (1972) o!ers a means of analysing contextual framing by treating representations as punctuations of experience which can be described at a number of di!erent levels which relate to each other. Bateson's contextual frames have already been used in analysis of human}computer interaction by Star and Ruhleder (1996) as part of their evaluation of Worm Community System. In that study, Bateson's model was used to &&analyse the levels of infrastructural complexity involved in system access and designeruser communication' ' (p. 111) . In this paper, it will be used to analyse the levels of complexity of observation and interpretation involved in understanding work and designing systems, with a view to explicating the potential for paradox in moving from understanding work to designing systems. Although Bateson argued that there could be an in"nite number of contexts or levels of punctuation, he described three and suggested that it would be di$cult to go any further.
Incommensurable contexts of punctuation
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Level 1 speaks to facts and simple actions within a given context. At this level, there is no need to consider context explicitly, as it is part of the taken-for granted of activity. In discussing these levels, I will make use of observations from a study of ambulance control reported in part in McCarthy, Wright, Healey, Dearden and Harrison (1997) . In ambulance control, the observation or statement &&the despatcher sent out the ambulance which had spent most time in station, at the station nearest the destination'' is, at level 1, a statement of fact which requires no justi"cation or discussion. On its own, the fact that is recorded in this statement o!ers little to a designer beyond suggesting the need for basic information such as the time ambulances arrive in station and the distance between stations and destinations. There is no sense of whether this information will be adequate for other instances of ambulance despatch. Neither is there any sense of whether this information would be deemed adequate by the despatchers or their managers.
For the analyst, the main issues at level 1 have to do facts and actions. For the designer, the main issues at level 1 have to do with &&straight-forward'' distribution of resources. &&Straight-forward'' in the sense that issues are considered &&unproblematically'' to relate to a single contextual frame. For example, at level 1, the distribution of information resources might be considered a technical problem without considering how it might also be an organizational and political issue.
LEVEL 2 ISSUES
Level 2 speaks to the contextualization of facts and actions, that is, organizing actions as part of a speci"c context or way of punctuating events. This involves identifying the process of interaction to which an action belongs as a prerequisite to a formal description of the context. Whereas classifying the form of activity involves naming patterns of actions, classifying the forms of context or interaction consists of naming patterns of relationships.
With respect to the work of the despatcher sending out an ambulance, Level 2 gives no more details of speci"c individual actions undertaken. However, by bringing two or more level 1 actions together or by bringing an action and a context together, it begins to construct the basis for an interpretation of those actions. For example, juxtaposing the observations that (1) the despatcher was instructed to always send out the ambulance nearest the destination and (2) the despatcher sent out the ambulance which had spent most time in station, at the station nearest the destination sets the despatcher's actions in a particular organizational context. Of course, the analyst would need more information before naming the context or pattern of relationships, but interpreting the interaction using these two observations alone suggests some possibilities: insubordination, procedure violation, loss of control etc. Add some more level 1 facts to the analytic mix and the name might change. For example, (3) the despatcher was instructed to meet targets for elapsed time between receipt of call and arrival of ambulance at the scene.
THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN
Given this information, an analyst might conclude that the context is more complex than any of the above names suggest. If there are times when the instructions in actions (1) and (3) are seen by the despatcher as contradictory, the context might be categorized quite di!erently.
An analyst commissioned to study ambulance control in this particular ambulance control centre might pursue the apparent contradictions in how the work is organized, try to understand the patterns of relationships between the various level 1 actions, or attempt a description of the task of ambulance control which paid little attention to these contextual factors.
The central level 2 issue for the argument being developed in this paper is the extent to which inscription of interactional forms and processes are permitted by a design methodology. It is in bringing action and context together in this manner that the potential for paradox in understanding work for design emerges. A particular method may be imposed for any of a number of reasons: project management, house style, or the salience of speci"c factors such as safety, company policy, or conceptual commitment. When the method requires that observations and analysis be reduced to &&unproblematic'' actions or facts, level 1 concerns, the analyst is asked to understand (in the sense of inscribing facts) but also to not understand (in the sense of inscribing patterns and relationships). Used in this way, a wide range of design methods from behaviour and cognitive task analysis to viewpoint analysis can become linguistically restrictive. It is not that they necessarily proscribe the inscription of interactional forms, more that they lend themselves to being used in that way especially when the design project is informed by a particular philosophy or worldview. For example, a design project, which at the outset is geared towards using hierarchical task analysis to identify and excise &&redundant'' actions in current practice, leaves little room for argument about the possible meanings and value of those actions.
LEVEL 3 ISSUES
Level 3 deals with the epistemological premises underlying a system of punctuation, the philosophies and worldviews mentioned above. Classifying these metacontexts consists of naming interactions patterned as parts of whole systems. We can think of it as contextualizing coordinating interactions in terms of the broader organization or society. This involves evaluating the contexts themselves, for example, making judgements on the quality or value of the particular contextualization represented by the interaction sequence described above. In a work setting, level 3 issues are often political: for example, should the analysis of ambulance control be concerned with the industrial relations aspects of contradictory instructions or should the analysis focus only on the actions required to accomplish the despatch of an ambulance?
At this metacontextual order of recursion, research and analysis processes fold back on themselves in a way which encompasses the researcher as an integral part of description or classi"cation. Level 3 choices are made between the sets of alternatives from which choices about how to contextualize or punctuate are made. Some examples of the sets of alternatives available might help clarify the point. The choice between a rational and a pragmatic approach to human action has been at the root of a debate in HCI and cognitive science in recent years, for example, between cognitive plan-based 202 models of action and situated contingent models of action. This is related to choices between &&worldviews'' which characterize human and machine as ontologically di!erent and those which blur boundaries between what should be considered as human and what should be considered as technology (e.g. actor network theory) as an analytic stance against determinism. As level 3 choices are always re#exive evaluations of ways of choosing which cannot be used in evaluating themselves, they tend to involve ethical and political sensibilities.
The paradox of understanding work for design can now be recast in terms of Bateson's levels of context. The paradox is created by placing frames or contexts which are internally consistent but incompatible with each other in a relation where one becomes the context of punctuation for the other. Speci"cally, when conceptualizations of design which already know where to draw boundaries between human and technology, plan and action, and which know where to draw the boundary around design discourse (for example, as a discourse on problem situations) are positioned as the context of punctuation for the understanding work (which arguably should be free to challenge myths about the appropriate boundaries), the analyst is faced with a paradox or a bind. As we can see from Bateson, it is the act of bringing them together as act and context or context and metacontext that produces paradox.
Paradox is not presented here as a negative or problematic factor which has to be swept away, rather as an inevitable feature of human understanding and communication. Von Foerster (1978) objected to various logicians'' (especially, Whitehead & Russell, 1910) attempts to use logical typing as an injunction against paradox. He suggested instead that self-referential paradox should be used as the conceptual building block for alternative views of the world, for example a view in which the observer always participates in what he observes. Keeney (1983) , following Bateson and von Foerster, commented that, as all statements are statements by observers, they are inevitably &&self referential and hence laden with paradox'' (p. 30). Within this context, he sees Bateson's use of logical typing in the levels of punctuation discussed above as an attempt to disclose rather than conceal self-referring paradox. It is also in that spirit that the explication of paradox in understanding work for design is undertaken in this paper.
Paradoxical or contradictory instructions given to an ambulance despatcher can be concealed until the paradox is revealed by practice and causes a problem, or it can be acknowledged and used as the basis for change. Either the particular instructions can be changed or the way in which ambulance despatch is contextualized can be reconsidered. Speci"cally, the relationship between responsibility to meet targets and autonomy in deciding how to meet these targets might be re-viewed. The manager required to be innovative and follow company procedures has to be doubly innovative to do both. Not just innovative in the sense intended in the instruction to be innovative, but also in the sense of de"ning management to accomplish both. That is, the manager may need to produce a view of the company and the job which is punctuated in such a way that the apparently contradictory directives are not contradictory. In both examples, change or learning is initiated by acknowledging a paradox at one level and framing a response at the next level up. This means becoming aware of and re#ecting on a context or a system of punctuation which was no more than background before. This paper can be seen as an attempt to disclose a potential paradox between the activities of understanding work by critically engaging with it and designing work systems by engineering or rational analysis THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN and to use that paradox to reframe ''understanding work for design&& by re-viewing design and how it relates to work at all. Although Bateson's levels of punctuation o!ers a means of re#ecting on paradox, it is important to have a feel for the speci"c potential for paradox in &&understanding work for design'' before attempting to reframe it. To elucidate this speci"c potential, a design frame which warrants rationalist, reductive interpretations and an approach to understanding work through critical engagement with it are juxtaposed in the following sections.
Rationalist design as a framing concept
The rationalist approach to design, typi"ed by requirements engineering and software engineering (Took, 1995; Kotonya & Somerville, 1998; Somerville, 1998) , values technical, abstract reasoning about systems and places method at the heart of the design process as an objective representation of design practice (Coyne, 1995) .
&&E!ective and e$cient construction of interactive systems needs "rstly a precise and abstract speci"cation of the functionality of the required system. Secondly it needs a rigorous development method by which to turn this speci"cation into a concrete speci"cation. This at least is the software engineering perspective on interactive system construction.'' (Took, 1995) The guiding myth presents design as rational problem solving with &&techne'' as the source of solutions. For example, Jackson (1995) provides a high-level description of software development as &&"tting the problem into a problem frame, a structure consisting of principle parts and a solution task'' . . . where . . . &&a problem frame is a generalization of a class of problems'' (p. 159). This software development process is prescriptive insofar as it tries to provide a plan to direct design practice. The plan can be described as a series of translations or transformations of representations from requirements to an implementable system. The implementable system is the desired end and the transformation of representation is the means for achieving this end. Moreover, the abstractions used to rationalize requirements can be used to make ontological claims about a world of work which can then be used to regulate work. For example, hierarchical organization charts can both make statements about the nature of authority and use the ontological status of those statements to underpin the exercise of that authority. Likewise, task models can be used to make ontological statements about the accomplishment of work which are in turn used in training or design to support decisions to regulate activities around that model. Software engineering design starts with an attempt to understand and describe what the eventual system will do. This involves activities which have been labelled as requirements capture, requirements speci"cation and requirements engineering (Jackson, 1995; Kotonya & Somerville, 1998; Somerville, 1998) . The rationalist approach generally takes an objective stance on requirements, implying that they exist prior to and separate from the design process itself and that the main concern of early stages in the design process is with capturing those requirements. There is an assumption that the requirements being uncovered correspond to a set of real expectations about what the system will do. Although some software engineering texts acknowledge problems such as ownership, it is often seen as amenable to technical solution. Techne abstracts away from the social and 204 political dimensions to present a technically contextualized representation of ownership, for example, a viewpoint analysis (Kotonya & Somerville, 1998; Viller & Somerville, 1998) . Re-presenting socio-political issues, such as ownership and perspective, as technical problems to be solved, e!ects no signi"cant change in design. By framing the social and political in a technical context, the particulars and potentialities are etched away in favour of a clear, single-layered view which neglects issues such as the situated interpretation of representations (Suchman, 1987) and contextualized use of models (Robinson, 1997) .
Software engineering methods suggest that once requirements have been captured the next step is to specify or express them in a manner appropriate for a number of audiences, for example, users, customers, designers and programmers. There are two related senses in which this is a problematic characterization. The "rst refers to what is meant by &&express''. Expression refers to uttering, writing down, inscribing and also to squeezing out or eliciting by applying pressure. It could be argued that when we try to force knowledge into particular notations (e.g. task models), we squeeze something out of the knowledge to create the formal representation. Referring back to Bateson's level of analysis, this point is a call for clarity about the use of di!erent expressions and how they are related to each other in practice.
There is, however, a sense in which the complexity of the relationship between expression and knowledge goes beyond a matter of clarity. The notion that the designer can translate knowledge of requirements into a semi-formal notation representing those requirements is challenged by conceptualizations of notation and thought completing each other (Donald, 1991; Vygotsky, 1987; Clark, 1997) . There is no straight-forward translation from knowledge or thought to notation as the notation has a hand in constructing the thought. According to Vygotsky: &&The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought. In that process the relation of thought to word undergoes changes that themselves may be regarded as development in the functional sense. Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them. '' (1987, p. 218) .
Words and other notations are not seen as expressing thoughts or knowledge. Rather notations and thoughts are seen to construct and complete each other. According to Vygotsky, expressing, writing down, inscribing is not simply a matter of recording thought, it is the thinking. To restrict what can be inscribed to the level of &&unproble-matic'' acts, for example, thereby proscribing inscription of interactional or relational forms, is to restrict the thinking. As Clark (1997) put it, writing is an act of manipulating the environment which transforms the computational or problem space for humans. With respect to requirements, the implication of thought and language completing each other is that requirements capture, analysis and speci"cation are not separable activities. The form and process of speci"cation and the requirements complete each other. To paraphrase Vygotsky:
&&The relation of speci"cation to requirement is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from speci"cation to requirement and from requirement to speci"cation. In that process the relation of speci"cation to requirement undergoes changes that themselves may be regarded as development in the functional sense. Requirements are not merely expressed in speci"cations; they come into existence through them.'' THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN For example, thinking about requirements in terms of a task model is a particular manipulation of the problem space of requirements and the language of the task model transforms the way of thinking about requirements. In Bateson's terms, it enforces a particular context for punctuating or making distinctions. The issue, in terms of the position being developed in this paper, is the relationship between that context for punctuation and the context for punctuation when attempting to understand something about a work setting. Robinson (1997) makes an important point, about the di!erent ways in which a representation or model can be used in di!erent contexts. A representation designed for use in one context can easily be used or misused in another context. When using them in a context other than the context in which they were developed, representations can often plausibly be taken to mean something other than was intended. As I am not a software engineer, I have used representations of software engineering from publications which claim to take a software engineering perspective for my characterization above. Moreover, I would conclude from my collaboration and discussion with software engineers that these representations are often intended as resources for practice, not as procedures to be followed rigidly. Nonetheless, the force of my argument still holds as the techniques and processes described by software engineers as &&software engineering'' point to a set of practices concerned with reducing complexity and eliminating ambiguity. It is these concerns that have the potential to stand in paradoxical relationship with the practices of understanding work.
ANALYSING WORK FOR A RATIONALIST DESIGN
The language and concerns of software engineering can constrain ways of thinking about understanding work. Following Clark, seeing design as a process of capturing and specifying requirements is an act of environmental manipulation which transforms the problem space for the work analyst. In so doing, it imposes linguistic restrictions which may constrain the nature of representations permitted as outcome, the use of those representations and the process of studying work itself.
Understanding work may start with observation but, as Anderson (1994) points out, it is not simply a matter of hanging around and seeing what goes on. Whether the researcher is an ethnographer, activity theorist or work psychologist, studying work is an act of interpretation with particular sensibilities of its own. These sensibilities do not reduce to any speci"c common concern, for example with information. In contrast with the drive towards reduction and fragmentation in rationalist design, these sensibilities tend towards relational characterization of workers and work practices. These relational interpretations are likely to seem messy to the rationalist designer and invite the technicist response which asks of what use they are in design. They often point to the kind of concerns and practices (&&requirements'') which Dix (1991) acknowledged may not be formalizable.
Following the discussion of paradox in the previous section, studying work can be seen as involving an observer who is always participating in what he observes, and inevitably making self-referential statements laden with paradox. Disclosing the paradox initiates change by pointing to the heretofore &&invisible'' context which frames the paradox. Concealing paradox is a way of avoiding any exploration of the framing 206 context. In other words, it avoids moving the interpretation to the next level of punctuation. When used to linguistically restrict the process of interpretation by proscribing inscription at the higher levels (e.g. the relationships and values at work in the setting being observed and in design), any design methodology conceals the paradox.
The Scandinavian adaptation of engagement and perspectivalism (e.g. Bodker, 1995 Bodker, , 1998 Bjerknes, Ehn & Kyng, 1987) , which emphasizes the political character of the gap between the design of technology and the concerns of the user, discloses paradox. It moves the discussion about work, requirements and design up a level of punctuation, in Bateson's terms, by exploring the sets of choice from which design and analysis choices are made. For example, it characterizes traditional design as management-centred and proposes an alternative design philosophy based on the tacit knowledge and skills of users and on supporting their interests (see also Blomberg, Suchman & Trigg, 1997) . In Bateson's terms, this approach has developed an alternative system of punctuation for design. In von Foerster's terms, it acknowledges the paradox and presents an alternative world view in which the observer inevitably participates in what is observed. The decision then becomes one of what form this participation takes. A position is taken in these Scandinavian studies of work and the Scandinavian approach to design which explicitly favours workers' interests, and a so-called &&objective'' stance is not allowed to detract from that engagement.
There are examples of other forms of engagement in design and in understanding work. Lave, Suchman, and others are committed to analyses which imagine activity in ways not permitted by rationalist cognitive science and HCI. Suchman is concerned with studying &&how people use their circumstances to achieve intelligent action'' (1987, p. 50): Lave and Wenger (1991) with explicating the dialectical relationship between person and setting which is marked by concerns with value and identity. In a similar vain, Star and others point up the contingent, negotiated character of work*work is not accomplished by following formal rules or task descriptions. Work is characterized as open, nondeterministic, and changing and the articulation process of keeping work going is identi"ed with negotiation . . . . . . &&which close the system locally and temporarily so that work can go on'' (Gerson & Star, 1986, p. 266) . These processes are invisible in rationalist account of work and would remain invisible if the analysis of work was framed solely by a rationalist design process.
The ways in which the process of studying work is framed is also relevant to a consideration of understanding work for design. Following Bateson's and von Foerster's arguments about the inevitability of self-reference in observation and Vygotsky's about the relationship between thought and language, understanding work can be seen as inevitably constructive and creative. It is an interpretative activity, not a matter of recording self-evident observations. In terms of Bateson's levels of punctuation, by revealing the paradox of "tting interpretative study of work into a software engineering frame, the discussion is moved to a level of punctuation where what is at stake is the set of choices from which particular forms of punctuating the study of work and design are made. I have also staked a claim at that level by insisting on the inevitability of construction, creativity, imagination and interpretation in understanding work. This claim has implications for any approach to design informed by understanding work.
Some implications of the assertion that understanding work is a constructive and creative activity are best seen by analogy with an activity which is more readily recognized as constructive and creative, for example, the kind of imaginative expression seen in artistic activity. Collingwood (1938) argued that imaginative expression cannot anticipate its own outcome, as it cannot conceive of its results as purposes in advance of executing them. However imaginative expression is not directionless. Rather, it is directed at exploring and trying to "nd out. This gives it direction but, as the end is not preconceived, there is no means to that end, no technique, available &&o! the shelf ''. It is not a matter of knowing what you see and painting it, rather a matter of learning to see and know through painting. Painting is not a means to the end of expressing what is seen, rather is means-and-ends simultaneously: the expression of what is seen and the seeing. In short, Collingwood argues that the painter paints a thing in order to see it, not to represent what is already seen. In like fashion, the analyst inscribing an interpretation can be both working out a way of seeing and presenting what is seen. Technical support, in the form of prescribed processes or forms of representation, is useful to the extent that it facilitates a simultaneity of means-and-ends. However, technique which forces a separation of means-and-ends enforces a particular context for understanding which is inevitably laden with paradox.
LEARNING FROM PARADOX
By illuminating the assumptions of one rationalist approach to design and highlighting the imaginative character of the analysis of work, this discussion reveals the paradox constituted by framing the study of work within a rationalist design contextual frame. Studying work is an activity of imaginative expression without preconceived means or ends which understands means-and-ends (the means of studying work and work) by exploring-and-expressing (self-referential observation and inscription). When framed by the demands of technicist design, that analysis contributes to its preconceived means and ends, imaginative expression is out of place. The contextual frame is incommensurate with the activity it frames. This is not an argument against technicist design. Rather it is an explication of the paradox of framing work analysis within technicist design.
However, as we have seen in Bateson's terms, paradox is an opportunity for learning. Acknowledging paradox, can be a step on the way to creating new forms of punctuation. Robinson's (1991) work on double-level languages can be seen as an attempt to do just that. In the face of separate technical and cultural punctuations of computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW), he proposed that double-level languages, in this case languages accommodating of both the technical and the cultural aspects of work, would be required for the design of successful CSCW applications. This is related to discussions of dialogues between technical and cultural activity (Robinson, 1991) , social and technical or wet and dry aspects of information (Goguen, 1997) , product and process (Bodker & Christiansen, 1997) and social scientists and computer scientists (Bowker et al., 1997) . These discussions emphasize the inevitability of a dialogical aspect in any approach to design which attempts to work simultaneously with a number of worldviews, where none of the worldviews is permitted to frame the others. It could be argued that some of these discussions point to the primacy of dialogue in design which is informed by understanding human activity and technical feasibility. Faced with the paradox of understanding work for design, they point to dialogue between apparently incommensurable worldviews as generative of new forms of punctuation.
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A detailed explication of this position would require another paper. However, in an attempt to clarify and consider brie#y what a dialogical punctuation of the relationship between design and understanding work means, aspects of such a punctuation are considered in the next section. Particular attention is paid to one aspect of understanding work for design, that is, representation.
Dialogically representing work for design
At one (Batesonian) level, bringing the word &&dialogue'' to bear on this discussion can be seen to point to the need for something like conversational interaction between the variety of participants involved in understanding work for design. At another, it can be seen as the basis for conceptualizing relations between design and understanding work. It is at this latter level that Bakhtin's (1981) conceptualization of the primacy of dialogue in relations between mind and world can be brought to bear of our discussion.
BAKHTIN'S DIALOGISM
According to Holquist (1990), Bakhtin's dialogism is &&an attempt to frame a theory of knowledge for an age when relativity dominates physics and cosmology and thus when non-coincidence of one kind or another*of sign to its referent, of the subject to itself*raises troubling new questions about the very existence of mind'' (p. 17).
Against this background, the conceptual basis of dialogism is the non-identity of mind and world which is, in turn, the source of other levels of non-concurring identity. For Bakhtin, the site of knowledge is never unitary, rather knowing is better seen in terms of dialogue.
As Gardiner (1992) put it, &&the dialogical word is locked into an intense relationship with the word of another. It is always addressed to someone*a witness, a judge, or simply a listener*and it is accompanied by the keen anticipation of another's response'' (p. 28).
In contrast, the monological word is a passive vehicle of neutral description or information, relatively disengaged, assuming disengagement, and producing disengagement. Monologue assumes a single, uni"ed, perspective. As such, it subordinates creative impulses. With monologue, the other (e.g. the user, representation or artefact) is always an object rather than an active participant. According to Bakhtin.
&&Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word. It closes down the represented world and represented persons. '' (Bakthin, 1984, pp. 292}293) Dialogically, everything is perceived from a unique position in space and time. This may be another way of expressing the inevitable self-re#exivity of observation and interpretation, noted in the earlier discussion of Bateson's level 3 (see Section 2.3). In a world in which knowing is decentred, just as much as in a world of paradoxical self-referential observation, whatever is observed is shaped by the position from which it is observed.
THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN
Bakhtin goes so far as to refer to perception and observation as authorship, a constructive act of meaning making by an author, an &&I'' with no referent other than a person who is always changing and di!erent. Dialogue is central because, in the relation of dialogue, these di!erences and changes are held together. In dialogue, the speakers are always di!erent from each other and the utterances they make are always di!erent from each other. Yet, as Holquist points out (p. 40), these di!erences are the building blocks of simultaneity. As nothing is in itself, existence is an event of co-being, not &&either/or'' but &&both/and'' simultaneously. As a philosophical statement on the use of language to make sense of or model existence, dialogism emphasizes social and ethical values as the means by which the I/other relationship articulates itself in particular situations. This points to the ways in which an author, an &&I'', treats others in his or her text: as object, as other or as other and self (polyphony, p. 34).
&&Dialogically conceived, authorship is a form of governance, for both are implicated in the architectonics of responsibility, each is a way of adjudicating center/non-center relations between subjects'' (Holquist, 1990, p. 34).
REPRESENTATION IN DESIGN
At the level of punctuation where epistemological choices are made about understanding work and designing systems, the dialogue between the technical and the imaginative involves strongly held perspectives and viewpoints. Dialogically, the languages, models, and representations used in understanding work for design are inseparable from the particulars of their use. In drawing attention to &&the word . . . locked into an intense relationship with the word of another'' (Gardiner, 1992) , dialogism highlights aspects of language and representation which resonate with relational intensity.
Let us take one aspect of models and representation familiar to those involved in understanding work for design, expressiveness. Expressiveness is sometimes seen as a characteristic of the language or representation per se but, dialogically, &&nothing is in itself '' (Holquist, 1990, p. 41) . Expression is concerned with meaning making and, as we noted earlier, it involves both inscription (talking, writing, drawing) and &&squeezing out''. Bakhtin alluded to a kind of cultural historical squeezing out as part of the process of meaning making. He suggested that making sense of events whose meanings are potentially unlimited involves reducing the number of meanings to a restricted set. Even natural languages do not use the large variety of possible sounds available. Some sounds are treated as noise and others are treated as signi"cant, and those which are signi"cant vary from language to language. From the point of view of evaluating representations of work for design, it might be useful to re#ect on the selections made in the representations used, particularly what is and is not permitted. In object-oriented software engineering a range of di!erent views, for example, a behavioural view and an information #ow view, are employed. This re#ects a decision that for some purposes, for example designing interactive systems that behave consistently, abstract expressions of system behaviour and/or information #ow provide the appropriate level of inscription. This argues for thinking about the expressiveness of a notation as related to a particular localized purpose in a particular dialogical context. The particularity of expressiveness referred to above points to two characteristics which go to the heart of a dialogical critique of representation of work in design: addressivity and un"nalizability. For Bakhtin, the restricted set of meanings is far from an agreed code, rather it is emergent from ongoing histories of dialogue. In that sense, the set is subject to change and the meaning of any particular representation can grow in meaning (Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 285) . From a dialogical perspective, it would be a mistake to think of expression as anything like the Shannon and Weaver (1964) telegraphic model of communication where well-formed thoughts are transformed into signals interpreted through an agreed code. In contrast with the telegraphic model, Bakhtin, for example, asserts that people distinguish among the myriad utterances addressed to them by discriminating among values.
If we are to think of design and the relevance of understanding work to design in dialogical terms, we need to see representations as something other than a series of relatively unproblematic depictions. Dialogically, the expressiveness of an utterance or representation is its addressivity. Dialogically, there is no meaning without response. Part of the power of the dialogical word is that it is used as both means-and-ends, it is the how-and-what. Dialogically, the word cannot be separated from its relational nexus of addressivity and responsivity. It is directed to someone and it is done so in expectation of a response. Likewise any representation expressing an analyst's interpretation of work practices which is intended for designers is part of a relational nexus, addressed to the designer while simultaneously listening to his imagined response. A design representation is dialogically useful to the extent that it enables participants in a dialogue to engage in this intense relational process of simultaneously speaking and listening. To the extent that it can be used to close o! speaking and listening, it closes o! dialogue.
Following both Bakhtin and Vygotsky, in his discussion of the relationship between thought and language, the idea of a representation as a depiction or expression of &&something already there'' is not viable. In the context of design, it might be more fruitful to see representations as attempts to communicate and share with another in a process of negotiating meanings of situations*a dialogical reframing of work activity rather than a depiction.
If addressivity is one of the main dialogical characteristics of an utterance or representation, un,nalizability is another. Un"nalizability points to the messiness and openness of any &&world'' being represented and of the representation. The world (of work, for example) is open to a range of interpretations, none of which can be the "nal word on it, as it is constantly di!erent and changing. As workers interact with each other and respond to events, they change themselves and their situation, sometimes in surprising and new ways. Representation of work (or of a putative system) can therefore be seen dialogically as an attempt to share one of many possible readings of &&reality'' (an observer's participative reading). This does not mean that such readings are arbitrary, rather that they carry with them possibility and the potential for the growth of new meanings and interpretations, they do not pretend to be closed or "nal, and they entail the potential for creative understanding. As such, they should be seen and used as local and particular but, simultaneously, as pointing beyond the local and particular to potential &&realities''.
To conclude this discussion of dialogical representation of work for design, we will brie#y re#ect on two representations, scenarios and accountability frameworks. This is THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN not a claim that they are dialogical and that other representations are not. As we have suggested above, there is only a very limited sense in which any representation per se can be dialogical, as nothing is in itself. Rather, the claim is that there are aspects of these representations that would suit a dialogical approach to understanding work for design.
USING REPRESENTATION DIALOGICALLY
Scenarios are stories of people and their activities (Carroll, 1995; Bodker & Christiansen, 1997) . As stories, they have validity in a dialogical &&world'' derived in large measure from Bakhtin's novelistic imagination. The characteristic elements of scenarios include settings, actors, goals and a plot described in terms of actions and events. These elements exist in dynamic interrelationship with each other, events and goals often shaping each other. The relationship between these parts and the whole scenario is also dynamic and complex, driven by concern for the what, where, when, how and who of narrated activity and narrative meaning making (Bruner, 1986) . When using scenarios in design, there is no attempt to hide complexity, ambiguity or dynamism. The aim in writing a scenario is not to reduce complexity or eliminate ambiguity. Rather a scenario or story stands as a single concrete description of people and their activities, open to interpretation and growth in meaning. By using the narrative form, it describes the particulars of activity while evoking alternative imagined worlds and activities. This un"nalizable quality of each scenario is emphasized when a collection of scenarios, stories of similar activities told from di!erent perspectives and for di!erent purposes, are placed in dialogue with each other in design.
Scenarios &&exist in the borderland between experience and expectation'' (Bodker & Christiansen, 1997) . As such, they can be a means for referring back to answerable practice while imagining future technologies and practices. Design, as intervention in socially organized practice, is likely to perturb existing situations and practices. Scenarios can be used to focus attention on the activities and experiences which are likely to be e!ected. They are told in a natural language and a narrative form which makes them available to a wide range of stakeholders. Their forte is in addressing the experiences and provoking the imaginations of many stakeholders, that is in provoking wide participation in identifying problems and generating ideas for solution. That is not to say that they are more expressive or addressive than a specialist representation such as an algebraic speci"cation. Rather that an algebraic speci"cation is addressed towards a di!erent audience for di!erent purposes. The point of a dialogical critique in this context is not to say that one representation is dialogical and another is not, but to focus attention on the addressivity and un"nalizability of all representations. The point is to reframe the activity of representing as &&communicating'' and to use this reframing to ask questions about the who, what, when, how and so on of participation in design dialogue.
In order to provoke a dialogical design process, Bodker has argued that scenarios should be complemented by the use of a range of other design tools and representations such as work-oriented checklists, technical-checklists and prototypes. Our contribution to Bodker's design toolbox is a simple framework for generating dialogue about the who, what, when, how and so on of accountability and responsibility at work . This framework is an attempt to maintain as much as possible of the character of concrete answerable work while, at the same time, enabling 212 us to analyse tasks, activities and the use of artefacts at the juncture between work and accountability. At this juncture, the addressivity and un"nalizability of task or artefact descriptions is most salient, as questions about the practical implications of particular task and artefact descriptions are unavoidable.
Like scenarios, the framework uses natural language description. However unlike scenarios, the framework organizes the descriptions spatially, losing much of the force of the narrative genre but possibly gaining a little in terms of the #exibility to reframe relations in work activity. The framework operates as a two-dimensional space in which artefactually mediated activities of interest are positioned. As we have used it so far, one dimension describes a continuum on which work practices are placed and the other describes a continuum on which accountability is placed. In previously reported work, we have used a range of dimensions including: explicit}implicit; global}local; stable}transient; and dependent}independent (see McCarthy et al., 1997, for details) . This set of dimensions is not intended to be complete. Rather this is a set of dimensions that we have found useful in describing the connectedness of work activity and accountability for a number of areas of work including aviation and radiography. The questions triggered by re#ecting on the dependence}independence or stability}transience of particular tasks and artefacts, in these contexts, led to consideration of perspective, responsivity and re#exivity and to a sensibility towards the un"nalizability of any representation of this work. Figure 1 is an example taken from some work on ambulance control reported in other papers McCarthy, 1998) and brie#y alluded to earlier in this paper. It exempli"es our use of the framework to consider aspects of the choice whether to represent order of return of ambulances to station on an electronic information display. Management policy was to exclude this information from the display as it was seen by them to distract from the main priority of getting the ambulance nearest the scene to the scene of an emergency. In response, when the information was excluded from the display, controllers represented it in personal notebooks. They saw the information as an essential element of their practice of getting ambulances to scenes of emergency day after day. From their perspective, relationships with ambulance crews were central, and &&return to station'' information allowed the controllers to share work across ambulance crews and to take advantage of local knowledge. Although management were concerned about the notebooks, they did not stop the controllers keeping them.
Our use of the framework highlighted a number of dialogical aspects of the relationship between the design of the display and understandings of the work of ambulance control. For example, it highlighted the complexity and responsivity of situated meanings of excluding &&return to station''. For managers, it was a way of focusing attention on proximity to the scene of an emergency when deciding which ambulance to despatch. For controllers, it was an attempt to interfere with practices of sharing work &&fairly'' and taking advantage of the local knowledge of crews, which they saw as crucial to developing the kind of working relationships that would regularly get ambulances to emergencies in good time. Both management and controllers were interested in getting ambulances to scenes of emergency as quickly as possible, but they saw the work di!erently. Using the framework also highlighted the ambiguity surrounding responsibility for aspects of an ambulance controller's decisions about which ambulance to despatch. There is a global accountability to management but local accountability to colleagues. This can be seen as a process of making hidden relationships visible and explicit for design dialogue. There is no commitment to the &&reality'' or &&"nality'' of these relationships. Within the framework, particular activities are used to point up relational practices and to imagine future relationships and practices.
Scenarios and accountability frameworks reframe rather than depict. The very space suggested by our framework, a space which accommodates relations between artefact use and accountability in the context of work activity is a form of reframing. Moreover, we have used the dimensions as a means for continually reframing an issue or a problem: 214 once we have framed it in terms of the explicit}implicit dimension, we reframe it in terms of one of the other dimensions. Therefore, as well as the overall socio-organizational perspective to which the framework is committed, we develop a range of reframings of that perspective.
Scenarios and this framework are of interest here as representations which have been used dialogically in meaning making. They can be used to involve a wide range of stakeholders in processes of making sense, identifying problems and generating ideas. These representations are not used as depictions of work or of imagined technology, rather as aspects of continuous dialogical reframing of work practices to look forward to possible technological futures.
Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to explore the relationship between design and understanding work with a view to reconceptualizing it in a way which rendered metaphors of bridging gaps and great divides unnecessary. The approach taken was to cast the problematics of the relationship in terms of paradox rather than gap. Using Bateson's levels of analysis, the paradox was revealed by specifying the problem as one of placing the analysis of work in a relation of level to the meta-level of design, a relationship which can be described as paradoxical as it involves two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference.
The advantage of thinking in terms of paradox rather than gap is in the potential for change and learning contained in Bateson's and von Foerster's construal of paradox. Paradox is not a problem to be solved or even concealed by skilled logicians, rather a dimension of experience to be disclosed. Following von Foerster, it has been argued here that revealing the self-referential paradox in understanding work for design is a way of moving on. Taken this way, paradox can be used as the conceptual building block for an alternative view of the &&world'' of design.
Sensitivity to the sensibilities of work has elicited a number of di!erent approaches to design, particularly to the relationship between design and understanding work. Suggestions in the literature include design as critique (Berg, 1996) , design as dialogue (Bentley et al. 1992; McCarthy, 1998) and design as innovation (Anderson, 1994) . In these cases, studying the organization of work is not intended to serve design but to reframe work and design through an imaginative expression with ethical sensibilities. In this paper, paradox was used as a conceptual building block for a dialogical view of the relationship between design and understanding work. It was used to clear ground by pointing to the limitations of the metaphor which has us bridging constructed gaps. It was also used to suggest an alternative view of the relationship based on dialogue between di!erent perspectives and practices. Dialogue has already been proposed as an appropriate metaphor for design. However, putting this particular building block in place has been more than a matter of restating the case. The conceptual work of revealing paradox and using it as the basis for re#ecting on &&design as dialogue'' shifts the focus from a dialogue of voices with di!erent areas of expertize, with di!erent status in the design process, to a dialogue between committed participants. As all observation is self-referential, the dialogue is always between interested parties, none of whom can claim a neutral perspective or a primary position.
THE PARADOX OF UNDERSTANDING WORK FOR DESIGN
In this paper, the dialogical approach was exempli"ed through a critical commentary on the use of particular representations in design. Two representations were chosen partly because they are the kinds of representations which lend themselves to evaluation in dialogical terms. Scenarios and accountability frameworks tell stories. They frame and reframe particular events or sequences of actions without claiming to be the "nal (monological) word on those events and actions. Because they are grounded in the particulars of events and actions but not limited by any speci"c framing of those events and actions they are open to interpretation and growth in meaning. This coupling of local practice with imagined futures is characteristic of dialogic. Moreover, scenarios and accountability frameworks are accessible representations. Through their addressivity, they lend themselves to engagement and participation by a wide range of stakeholders. They are designed to elicit responses, not least alternative renderings including disagreement. Thus, they can be used dialogically to reveal and build on contradiction and paradox.
It is worth reiterating a point made earlier, that scenarios and accountability frameworks are not the only dialogical representations available. Indeed it is probably better to think of no representation as dialogical in itself and all representations as being open to a dialogical reading. For example, algebraic speci"cations can be seen as dialogical insofar as they are used as representations about which designers can argue. However dialogic has a political dimension which does not allow us to forget the who, when and how of design decisions. Dialogic is concerned not so much with the so-called inherent properties of a representation as with whether and how a representation is used to permit some people to participate or some to participate at particular times only. In this sense, there are certainly di!erences between scenarios and algebraic speci"cations.
It is also worth remembering that dialogic is not the &&one'' and it is not a methodology. Dialogical design is one way of working with potentially paradoxical relationships. Design as critique and innovation may be others. The value of a dialogical approach which I have tried to bring out in this paper, but which is not always explicit in dialogically oriented papers, is the potential it o!ers for conceptualizing relational readings of events or situations. The combination of Bateson's ecological framing and Bakhtin's dialogical approach to relations o!ers an invitation to go beyond the kind of converzational interaction, suggested in some dialogically oriented papers, between engineers and social scientists (e.g. Bentley et al., 1992) or between the technical and social in design (e.g. Robinson, 1991) to the beginnings of a reconceptualization of relations, be they interpersonal or conceptual, and to a reconceptualization of design and understanding work in terms of relationships. For example, the relations of dialogue* responsivity, addressivity and un"nalisability*can hold the elements of a decentred design process together in an event of co-being, not either/or but both/and simultaneously. Further unpacking of these relations is the subject of ongoing work which will build on the base provided by the work in this paper.
A "nal suggestion*the combination of ecology and dialogue, used in this paper to explore relationships between di!erent activities in design, may also provide the basis for understanding how and why di!erent approaches to design emerge. If a theory of the ecology and dialogics of design were available, it might help make sense of why approaches to design emphasizing critique, innovation and dialogue arise and why they appear to be di!erent from &&mainstream'' approaches to design. Such a theory might 216 begin by re#ecting on Bateson's (1979) description of processes tending towards tautology*&&internal consistence of ideas and processes'' (p. 221)*a consistency which is ruptured from time to time. Bateson describes the healing process that follows such a break as slow, self-healing, which may involve extermination of some ideas and processes. Another way of describing this process of break and ruthless healing is as movement from one level of analysis to the next. Bakhtin's contribution to kicking o! this conceptualization of the emergence and disappearance of approaches to design would be to posit a dialogical dynamics in what he would consider to be the prosaic movement between levels of analysis. One rendering of the combination of ecology and dialogics in a conceptualization of the emergence of di!erent approaches to design is in terms of an evolution of voices in the sense making of design, a process in which di!erent voices may seem natural at di!erent times, but in which none are ever fully naturalized.
